Parliamentary privilege in India by Shanmuganathan, D.
Parliamentary privilege in 
India *
by D Shanmuganathan
In this article the author offers some advice to the Indian Parliament 
in the light of the UK Joint Committee Report on Parliamentary 
Privilege 1999.
O n 1 May 2000, a full bench of the Supreme Court of India referred a case filed by the Centre for Public Interest Litigation to the Constitutional 
Bench requesting a 'declaration regarding the correctness'To o o
of the immunity provision under art. 105(2) of the 
Constitution for Members of Parliament without 
disturbing the judgment in the case of P V Narasimha Rao v 
State (CBI/SPE) (1998) 4 SCC 626 (hereafter PVN Rao).
The Constitution provides immunity as follows:
'105. Powers, privileges etc. of the House of Parliament and of 
the Members and Committees thereof 
(D ...
(2) No Member of Parliament shall be liable to any 
proceedings in any court in respect of anything said or any vote 
given by him in Parliament or any Committee thereof, and no 
person shall be liable in respect of the publication by or under 
the authority of either House oj Parliament of any report, paper, 
votes or proceedings.'
On a previous occasion the Constitutional Bench of the 
Supreme Court, in a split decision of 3 to 2, had held that 
Members of Parliament who accepted pecuniary 
advantages to vote in a particular pattern in the Parliament 
were entitled to immunity under art. 105(2) of the 
Constitution and absolved the charges levelled against 
them. In the present case, the petitioner's forum 
challenged that the lawmakers should not be granted 
'absolute immunity' against prosecution. The petitioner's 
counsel told the Supreme Court that:
'... when some of them give bribes to others to vote in 
Parliament, in a particular manner, and if people with criminal 
backgrounds are put in those positions, they will have little or no
respect for the rule of law. This will subvert the very basis of 
Parliamentary democracy.' (Times of India, 2 May 2000)
Furthermore the counsel informed the Supreme Court 
that:
'... the menace of corruption was posing a grave threat to 
parliamentary democracy, and every dignitary, right from the 
President and Prime Minister, had been expressing concern over 
this.'
The following day the Supreme Court's referral was 
echoed in the Parliament. Some members expressed their 
concern that the judiciary was intruding into the subject 
matter of parliamentary sovereignty and the result seemed 
likely to be a conflict between the legislature and the 
judiciary.
The following discussion of the Indian Supreme Court's 
earlier decision on parliamentary privilege and recent 
developments in relation to parliamentary privilege in the 
UK could be a guideline for the Indian Parliament. This 
would avoid the judiciary/legislature conflict, and provide 
a new law to prosecute Members of Parliament for bribery 
charges by amending the existing law in the Prevention of 
Corruption Act 1988.
BACKGROUND
Following the decision on 17 April 1998 in P V N Rao, 
where in a split decision of 3 to 2 the Constitutional 
Bench of the Supreme Court held that Members of 
Parliament accepting pecuniary advantages to vote in a 
no-confidence motion were entitled to immunity (see 
above), the Constitutional Bench considered a number of 
judgments addressing the issue of parliamentary privilege
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from various national courts in the UK, US, Australia and 
Canada, and failed to reach a unanimous decision. 
Although the Supreme Court of India discussed a 
judgment of Buckley J in which the Honourable Judge 
invoked the common law for corruption charges against a 
Member of Parliament in England, the Bench felt that as 
the judgment came from only a trial judge it could not be 
relied on as precedent (R v Greenway S^Ors (1998) PL 356).
Moreover, the majority opinion identified that a 
sanctioning process, as required under the Prevention of 
Corruption Act 1988 for prosecuting public servants, is 
absent in relation to Members of Parliament, who are in 
essence also public servants. Section 19 of the Prevention of 
Corruption Act 1988 requires:
'Previous sanction necessaryjbr prosecution  (]) No Court 
shall take cognisance of an offence punishable under s. 7, 10, 
11, 13 and 1 5 alleged to have been committed by a public 
servant, except with the previous sanction.'
Hence the Supreme Court left the issue of bribery 
related to Members of Parliament to be addressed by the 
Indian Parliament.
SUPREME COURT REFERRAL
On 1 May 2000, a full bench of the Supreme Court of 
India referred a case filed by the Centre for Public 
Interest Litigation to the Constitutional Bench 
requesting a 'declaration regarding the correctness' of 
the immunity provision under art. 105(2) of the 
Constitution for Members of Parliament...
The recent UK Joint Committee Report on 
Parliamentary Privilege 1999, headed by Lord Nicholls of 
Birkenhead (vol. 1, Stationery Office: London) addressed 
the issue of parliamentary privilege for bribery charges. It 
recommended that parliamentary privilege should be set 
aside for bribery charges against Members of ParliamentJ o o
and that the senior law officer of the State should be 
appointed as the competent authority to grant sanction to 
prosecute Members of Parliament. This recommendation 
could be helpful in addressing the issue of bribery among 
Members of Parliament in India. However, it would have 
to be discussed by the Indian Parliament, before it could 
implement the necessary amendment to the Prevention of 
Corruption Act 1988 to provide for the prosecution of 
Members of Parliament for bribery charges irrespective of 
whether the alleged offence occurred inside or outside 
Parliament.
THE 1993 NO-CONFIDENCE MOTION
On 26 July 1993, a no-confidence motion was moved in 
Parliament against the minority government of the theno J o
Prime Minister of India, Mr P V Narasimha Rao. At that 
time he had the support of 2 5 1 Members of Parliament 
out of 533. Mr Rao and his party's high command were
alleged to have engineered a campaign of bribing and 
splitting the membership of different political parties in 
Parliament in order to defeat the no-confidence motion. 
On 28 July 1993, the no-confidence motion was 
successfully defeated on the floor.
In 1996, a complaint against the Prime Minister Mr P V 
Narasimha Rao and others was filed with the Central 
Bureau of Investigation — India (the CBI) alleging that in 
1993 there had been a criminal conspiracy by the ruling 
party to gain a majority on the floor by bribing Members 
of Parliament from different political parties, individuals 
and groups. On the basis of the complaint, cases were 
registered against Mr P V Narasimha Rao and others 
under s. 120—B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and s. 7, 
12, 13(2), read with 13(l)(d)(iii), of the Prevention of 
Corruption Act 1988. After the completion of its 
investigation the CBI filed three charge sheets before ao o
Special Judge. The charges against Mr P V Narasimha Rao 
by the Special Judge (P V N Rao, p. 705) read as follows:
'That, you, P V Narasimha Rao, between July and August 
1993 at Delhi and Bangalore were party to a criminal 
conspiracy and agreed to enter into an agreement with your co- 
accused to defeat the no-confidence motion moved on 
26 7 1993 against the then Congress Government headed by 
you by illegal means, viz., to offer or cause to offer and pay 
gratification other than the legal remuneration to your co- 
accused persons namely J M M and Janata Dala MPs named 
above as a motive or reward Jbr their helping in defeating the 
said no-confidence motion moved by the opposition parties and 
in pursuance of the said agreement you paid or caused to pay 
several lakhs of rupees to the above referred J M M and Janata 
Dala MPs who obtained or attempted to obtain the same in the 
manner stated above and thereby you have committed an offence 
punishable under s. 120-B IPC read with s. 7, 12, 13(2) and 
read with s. 13( l)(d) of the Prevention ofCorruption Act 1988 
within my cognisance.
Secondly, you, P V Narasimha Rao in pursuance of the 
aforesaid criminal conspiracy during the aforesaid period and at 
the aforesaid places abetted the commission of the offence 
punishable under s. 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act by 
above referred J M M and Janata Dala MPs and thereby you 
have committed an offence punishable under s. 12 of the 
Prevention of Corruption Act and within my cognisance.'
Similar charges were brought against other persons 
allegedly involved in these acts of bribery.
LEGAL BATTLE FROM TRIAL COURT TO 
SUPREME COURT
The accused initially raised objections concerning the 
jurisdiction of the court to try the case on the ground of 
the privileges and immunities of the House of Parliament. 
However, the Special Judge overruled these objections by 
holding that the case before him did not relate to the 
pattern of voting in Parliament, but to alleged illegal acts 
committed by the accused outside Parliament. The
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accused also contended that as they were not public 
servants, the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 was not 
relevant in this case. The Special Judge rejected their 
objection, citing a Delhi High Court judgment (L KAdvani 
v Central Bureau of Investigation (1997) 66 DLT 618) which 
held that a Member of Parliament is a public servant.
The Special Judge's order was later challenged before 
the Delhi High Court, which declined to interfere witho '
the order. Eventually the case reached a Full Bench of the 
Supreme Court, which, after hearing argument from both 
sides, felt that the questions raised by the accused should 
be decided by the Constitutional Bench. Accordingly the 
Full Bench raised the following substantial question of 
law:
'as to the interpretation of art. 105 of the Constitution of 
India raised by the petitioners/accused persons.'
The dissenting judgment of Mr Justice Agrawal and Mr 
Justice Anand (concurring), found that the petitioners 
were not entitled to claim immunity. On the other hand, 
the majority opinion of Mr Justice Bharucha and Mr 
Justice Rajendra Babu (concurring) and the separate 
opinion filed by Mr Justice G N Ray found that bribe 
takers who voted in the no-confidence motion could not 
be prosecuted for the alleged crime.
Both majority and dissenting opinion relied mainly on 
Commonwealth judicial decisions, UK Parliamentary 
reports and Erskine May's Parliamentary Practice.
POSITION IN THE UK
Where similar situations have arisen in the UK such as 
'cash for questions' involving Members of Parliament, 
Parliament has commissioned reports to resolve the issues 
(D Oliver & G Drewry, eds, The Law and Parliament, 
Butterworths, 1998). Parliamentary reports such as the 
Salmon Report on Conduct in Public Life (1976 Cmncl 
6524) and the Nolan Committee Report on Standards in 
Public Eife (HMSO: Eondon 1995) were referred to by 
the Constitutional Bench in detail.
The Salmon Committee (at p. 98) addressed the issue of 
bribery of Members of Parliament thus:
'... neither the statutory nor the common law applies to the 
bribery or attempted bribery of a Member of Parliament in respect 
of his parliamentary activities but "corrupt transactions" 
involving a Member of Parliament in respect of matters that had 
nothing to do with his parliamentary activities would be caught 
by the ordinary criminal law.'
The Salmon Committee recommended (at para. 311, p. 
99) that Members of Parliament should be brought within
' O
the ambit of the criminal law for corruption, bribery and 
attempted bribery.
'Membership of Parliament is a great honour and carries with 
it a special duty to maintain the highest standards of probity, 
and this duty has almost invariably been strictly observed ... We
recommend that Parliament should consider bringing corruption, 
bribery and attempted bribery oja Member of Parliament acting 
in his parliamentary capacity within the ambit of the criminal 
law.'
Nearly 20 years after the Salmon Report, the 1995 
Nolan Committee Report (at para. 104, p. 43) suggested 
that the issue be left to the Eaw Commission.
"... We recommend that the Government should now take 
steps to clarify the law relating to the bribery of or the receipt of 
a bribe by a Member oj Parliament... This might be a task which 
the Law Commission could take forward.'
In the period between these two reports, Buckley J, in an 
unreported judgment in 1992 (1998 PE 356 at 363) held:
'That a Member of Parliament against whom there is a prima 
Jade case of corruption should be immune from prosecution in 
the court of laws is to my mind an unacceptable proposition at 
the present time. I do not believe it to be the law.'
The recent Joint Committee Report on Parliamentary 
Privilege discussed Buckley J's decision but noted that it 
had not been considered by a higher court (at para. 136, 
p. 40):
"... The trial judge ruled that members were subject to the 
common law offence, but his ruling was not tested before the 
court of appeal.'
Mr Justice Bharucha (party to the majority) expressed a 
similar opinion to the Joint Committee Report:
'For the first time in England, Buckley J ruled in R v 
Greenway that the member of parliament who accepts a bribe to 
abuse his trust is guilty of the common law offence of bribery. 
This innovation in English law needs to be tested in appeal.' 
(P V N Rao at p. 731)
It is pertinent to mention here that the report by the UK 
Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege (1999) 
recommended that Members of Parliament should be 
liable for prosecution for bribery charges under the 
criminal law with the consent of the Attorney-General. The 
relevant portion of the report (p. 5) is reproduced here:
'Bribery
[Members of either house are at present subject by statute to 
the law of bribery in respect of proceedings in Parliament]
Recommendation 13. Members of both houses should be 
included within the scope offorthcoming legislation on 
corruption. Article 9 (Bill of Rights 1689) should be set aside 
in any criminal proceedings for bribery. Prosecution under the 
new legislation, whether of a member or non-member should 
require the consent of a law officer.'
Further the Report recommended (at para. 173, p. 48):
' ... We agree, and recommend that prosecution under the 
new legislation should require the consent of the Attorney General 
or, in Scotland, the express consent of the Lord Advocate.'
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